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ABSTRACT 
 
This study investigates the relationships between corporate governance variables and 
tunnelling activities in Indonesia. Using 2216 firm-year observations from 2005 to 2012, 
we find that several corporate governance variables contribute to explaining the 
phenomenon of tunnelling in Indonesia. The data reveal that approximately 276 firms 
had experienced expropriation in the form of tunnelling, particularly expropriation from 
majority to minority shareholders, which can be identified through the related party 
transaction. We find that firms with family and state ownership tend to experience 
tunnelling. This result is consistently revealed when we separate the data into eight 
industries. We document that the SINGLE ownership variable, which depicts family 
ownership, the STATE ownership variable, and the LEVERAGE variable have a positive 
influence on TUNNELING. In contrast, the institutional (INST) ownership variable has a 
negative influence on TUNNELING. However, BOARD_SIZE, OUTSIDERS, GROUP 
ownership, and BIG FIVE auditor variables have no significant effect on TUNNELING 
activities. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The Indonesian Institute for Corporate Governance (IICG), in collaboration with 
SWA magazine on Indonesian public companies, conducted a survey on the 
implementation of Good Corporate Governance (GCG). Not many firms 
responded to the survey. Of the 332 firms approached, only 31 companies 
actively participated—a response rate of less than 10%. For a comparison, a 
similar survey conducted in developed countries was responded to by more than 
70% of companies. This phenomenon reflects that there is a low awareness about 
implementing the GCG in Indonesia (IICG, 2012). 
The low response rate is unsurprising. Another survey conducted from 
1998–2000 by La Porta, Lopez, Shleifer and Vishny (2000a; 2000b) regarding 
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the protection of investors and corporate governance classifies Indonesia as a 
country with a low implementation of GCG. The low implementation of GCG 
obviously had an effect on the lack of protection, particularly for minority 
shareholders. Additionally, this condition directly caused the confidence of 
investors, particularly foreign investors, to drop in terms of holding the shares of 
public companies in Indonesia. In the middle of 1998, the market was almost 
abandoned by foreign investors. Only speculators and domestic players survived 
in this situation. It was not surprising that in 1998, Indonesia's stock exchange 
experienced its lowest point of its operational activity. 
The low awareness of GCG has notably led to higher risks of investing 
activity in Indonesia. This condition has a direct effect on the level of investment. 
Moreover, the lack of GCG is reportedly suspected the cause the loss of investors' 
and creditors' confidence to extend their credit. Trauma due to the reckless 
mounting of bad loans during the era (1998) is still haunting banks. This 
circumstance is noted by Wiwattanakantang (2001), who studies the effects of 
controlling shareholders on firm performance in Thailand. The work of 
Wiwattanakantang indicates that the controlling shareholders in Thailand do not 
act in expropriation (abused by the majority of shareholders) on the company's 
assets. In fact, the existence of controlling shareholders is presumably associated 
with higher firm performance. (Performance is specifically measured by ROA 
and the ratio of sales to assets.) This happens because virtually all companies in 
Thailand do not implement the controlling mechanisms in separating voting 
rights with the right of cash flows. As consequence, controlling shareholders are 
being constrained by themselves and do not acquire private benefits. 
In emerging economies, the concentration of ownership seems real. 
Khanna and Palepu (2000a) reveal that in India, the majority of public companies 
are associated with diversified business groups and controlled by a number of 
families. According to the analysis conducted by Claessens, Djankov and Lang 
(2000), in several emerging markets, except for Japan, more than 40% of public 
companies in 9 Asian countries disclosed that they had dominant owners who 
were determined by families. In companies that have concentrated ownership, the 
controlling shareholders have the opportunity to perform expropriation through 
various methods. For instance, Johnson, La Porta, Lopez-De-Silanes and Shleifer 
(2000) report that the controlling shareholders are inclined to extract or extort 
cash by selling assets, goods, or services to the company through transactions that 
benefit themselves. They obtain a loan with a term that is likely more attractive 
and imposing and then subsequently transfer the assets of a listed company to 
another company that is still in control. Reciprocally, they might have diluted the 
interests of minority shareholders to acquire additional shares at preferential 
prices. 
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The cases of expropriation or asset tunnelling by controlling shareholders 
have been highlighted by a vast body of literature. There is considerable 
empirical evidence that demonstrate the level of resources abused by majority 
shareholders. However, other than this empirical evidence, little systematic 
evidence is directly available regarding specific transactions, such as what in 
particular causes expropriation. Virtually all seminal studies only attempt to 
measure the phenomenon of indirect expropriation (see, e.g., Bertrand, Mehta, & 
Mullainathan, 2002; La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, & Vishny, 2000a; 
2000b; 2002; Claessens, Djankov, Fan, & Lang, 2002; Faccio, Lang, & Young, 
2001), and almost all of them offer mixed evidence that minority shareholders 
lose value due to the actions of the specific expropriation (see, i.e., Bae, Kang & 
Kim, 2002).  
We meticulously examine the link between the corporate governance 
variables and expropriation in Indonesia. With this focus, the research objective 
is to investigate the contribution of corporate governance variables toward 
expropriation surrogated by the presence of tunnelling activities. As noted by Li, 
Wang and Sun (2004), corporate governance problems can seriously obstruct 
economic development. We consider how to prevent tunnelling and protect the 
interests of minority shareholders. In this case, we first have to identify the failed 
mechanism of corporate governance that causes asset appropriation in Indonesia. 
Furthermore, tracking back to the focus of problems, this research contributes to 
the re-conceptualisation and the discovery of the empirical evidence with respect 
to the construct of tunnelling. We also want to confirm those reasons by 
employing a panel data regression model, in which firm characteristics such as 
firm size, leverage, and the effects of industrial groups can reduce the probability 
of tunnelling in the context of an emerging market, such as the Indonesia Stock 
Exchange (IDX), similar to the evidence of tunnelling activities in the Asian 
market, as reported by Claessens et al. (2000). 
 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
Ownership Structure of the Public Companies in Indonesia 
Herdinata (2008) reveals that the overall ownership structure of listed companies 
in the IDX is not different from other public companies in Asia. In general, 
almost all public companies in Asia are dominated and controlled by family 
firms. When a company goes public, it does not necessarily reduce the control of 
the founding family. On the contrary, the company is still dominated by the 
family that funds its operational activity.  
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In several cases, family ownership is connected to political support. This 
circumstance was highlighted by Leuz and Oberholzer-Gee (2006), who state that 
family members who have a connection in terms of involvement with the 
government, or vice versa, are less likely to have publicly traded foreign 
securities. Using data from Indonesia, their study confirms that the estimation of 
the performance consequences of foreign financing are severely biased if value-
creating domestic arrangements such as political relationships are ignored. 
Moreover, Sumiati and Agustia (2011) and Sirat (2012) document that the 
concentration of ownership in the form of a family firm or state-owned firm are 
likely to experience higher expropriation in supporting the parent company. 
Additionally, Claessens, Djankov and Lang (1999) report that family 
firms have dominated the concentration of the market capitalisation of public 
companies in East Asia. They show that the number of public shares held by 10 
large family enterprises in Indonesia has reached 57.7%. Other evidence 
describes similar results; the results of a cross-country study reveal that the 
portion of family owned companies in the Philippines and Thailand has reached 
52.5% and 46.2%, respectively. Similar results are found in Malaysia and Korea; 
both of these countries are controlled by 15 family firms, and the concentration of 
majority ownership in these two countries is approximately 28.3 and 38.4%, 
respectively. 
Moreover, Dwinanto (2010) examines 395 companies in the IDX. He 
describes that in 2009, the portion of publicly owned companies in the Indonesia 
Stock Exchange was approximately 27.6% on average, and the majority of public 
ownerships was under 60%. Figure 1 presents information regarding the detailed 
distribution of publicly owned companies in Indonesia. 
 
Figure 1. The proportion of publicly owned companies in 2009 Indonesia  
Stock Exchange (Source: Dwinanto, 2010) 
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Expropriation, Tunnelling, and Conglomeration 
Expropriation is an action taken by controlling shareholders with the intention to 
benefit through either legal or illegal methods (Faccio et al., 2001). When the 
flow of benefits that is enjoyed by the controlling shareholders is clearly 
perceptible, it can be identified as moving in one of two directions: from the 
subsidiary to the parent company or from the parent company to its subsidiary. 
Johnson et al. (2000) argue that the term of tunnelling refers to the expropriation 
activity conducted by the controlling shareholders of a company in the lower 
level (e.g., subsidiary) to the higher level (parent company). The term "propping" 
leads to the opposite condition in which the controlling shareholders drain either 
funds or resources from the parent company to subsidiary. 
The exploitation of minority shareholders by controlling shareholders has 
attracted the attention of researchers. For instance, Shleifer and Vishny (1986) 
find that when the majority shareholders control the company, the agency 
problem is no longer about the conflict of interest between management and 
shareholders but about how to prevent controlling shareholders from exploiting 
minority shareholders. Johnson et al. (2000) invented the term "tunnelling" to 
describe the asset appropriation conducted by large shareholders who legally or 
illegally transfer assets and profits for themselves. Tunnelling is not only 
detrimental to the interests of minority shareholders but also seriously precludes 
the development of the capital market (Johnson et al., 2000; Wurgler, 2000; 
Bertrand et al., 2002). 
Furthermore, we consider concentrated ownership as a characteristic of 
the ownership structure for companies in emerging markets. In general, a 
company is formed as a part of a complex ownership structure that is owned by 
an individual or a family. This complexity is known as a group or conglomeration 
in which virtually all owners have shares in different companies and are affiliated 
or related to a business group (Bae et al., 2002).  
 
Hypothesis Development 
Our research focuses in particular on the corporate governance practice that has 
shifted from problems between shareholders and management to problems 
between majority shareholders and minority shareholders (Shleifer & Vishny, 
1997; Johnson et al., 2000; Denis & McConnell, 2003). As suggested by Denis 
and McConnell (2003), to reduce the problems caused by controlling 
shareholders for minority shareholders, policymakers are recommended to rectify 
the following two good corporate governance mechanisms: (1) internal 
mechanisms, including the Board of Director (BOD) structure, a senior 
management incentive system, the ownership structure, the type of block-holding 
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shareholders, institutional ownership, and the transparency of the company and 
(2) external mechanisms, including market competition, environmental laws, the 
protection of minority shareholders, market development, and competition in the 
market product. 
To measure the structure of the BOD, we use the percentage of external 
members, particularly the BOD members who are not associated with the 
company before becoming a member of the BOD. As mentioned by Yermack 
(1996), BOD members are usually more familiar with the internal operations. 
This condition is supposed to improve the efficiency and decision-making 
process undertaken by the BOD. Nevertheless, as the percentage of members 
from the internal BOD increases, the company becomes more controlled by 
management and controlling shareholders. Therefore, we develop the first 
hypothesis: A higher percentage of external BOD members will prevent the 
tunnelling activity conducted by controlling shareholders. 
As revealed by Jensen and Murphy (1990), the increase in the number of 
BOD members is rational enough to improve the efficiency of the BOD, 
particularly if they have diverse backgrounds. Consequently, it becomes 
increasingly difficult for the CEO or senior management to manipulate the 
performance of the BOD. Hence, the BOD is functionally better in coordinating, 
balancing the interests of all parties, and restraining the tunnelling. However, 
when the BOD becomes too large, communication becomes difficult. This 
circumstance leads to less efficiency and effectiveness, as noted by Yermack 
(1996). For this reason, we formulate the second hypothesis: A higher number of 
BOD outsider members helps reduce tunnelling. 
Gomes and Novaes (2001) argue that concentrated ownership also 
facilitates the appropriation of assets. This happens because majority 
shareholders not only dominate the stockholder meetings and the board of 
directors but also determine the daily operation of the company, appoint someone 
as the CEO, and establish the senior management. Shi and Shitu (2004) find that 
in 2001, shareholders participated in the process of electing 82.9% of all CEOs in 
Chinese listed firms. Furthermore, approximately 52.4% of BODs or CEOs had a 
position in those companies. Given to this dependency, it seems that the CEO 
decides everything based on the interests of the majority shareholders. We thus 
design the third hypothesis: Companies with shareholders who are concentrated 
in single block-holding show more tunnelling than companies with a principal 
shareholder. 
Riyanto and Toolsema (2008) report that family firms prefer to use the 
system of a pyramid ownership structure. According to their research, the 
possibility of the existence propping in business groups is generally depicted on a 
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pyramid structure. It implicitly gives external investors the impression that there 
are inter-corporate guarantees within the group (or inter-corporate insurance), 
particularly when the problem of financial distress exists. In this case, investors 
would be presumably expropriated to some extent through tunnelling, with the 
hope that their compensation gains greater probability in realising a positive 
return in the future. Therefore, we build the fourth hypothesis: Companies with 
block-holding shareholders in a business group are more likely to experience 
tunnelling. 
According to a study by Gao and Kling (2008), most Chinese public 
companies are settled as the result of the transformation from state-owned 
enterprises (SOE). Indonesia is reported to be similar in that respect. Government 
companies that have a good performance presumably tend to be privatised. In the 
case of privatisation, the unit of businesses that have a good performance are 
separated from the other companies and submitted to the stock exchange, and the 
remaining company, which has an ordinary performance, acts as a holding 
company. Consequently, when the parent company is in trouble, it uses the 
resources from the listed companies to maintain its operations. Bai, Liu, Lu, Song 
and Zhang (2004) note that companies that are controlled by the state are more 
likely to experience tunnelling. Thus, we develop hypothesis five: A company 
will experience more serious tunnelling if its block shareholder is the 
government.  
Jarrell and Poulsen (1987), Shleifer and Vishny (1986), McConnell and 
Servaes (1990), and Brickley, Lease and Smith (1988) report that institutional 
investors tend to use corporate management actions that would destroy the 
shareholder's value. In contrast to the findings in other countries, Tang, Luo and 
Wang (2004) note that if the second largest Chinese public company's 
shareholder is an institution, it will be inclined to experience tunnelling in severe 
conditions. Given this condition, we develop hypothesis six: A greater percentage 
of institutional investors will increase the practice of good corporate governance, 
thereby decreasing the practice of tunnelling. 
In general, public accounting firms with an international reputation will 
offer a reliable and superior audit opinion. With respect to signalling games, 
when a public company hires an accounting firm that requests a higher fee and 
offers a high-quality audit opinion, it indirectly provides a signal that the 
company has a good structure and implementation of corporate governance. 
Obviously, selecting one of the top five accounting firms can help the company 
avoid the possibility of tunnelling and signal to the investor that the company has 
a good implementation of good corporate governance. Therefore, we design the 
hypothesis seven: The possibility of tunnelling is reduced if the accounting firm 
is determined from one of the top five leading international auditing companies. 
Ridwan Nurazi et al. 
134	  
The large-cap companies generally tend to have more power and 
methods in implementing the tunnelling activity. A company with a high leverage 
ratio typically requires substantial cash to meet its obligations. This problem can 
be solved if the company has a great performance and many subsidiaries to 
control. It can also utilise funds from its subsidiaries to fulfil the debt. For this 
reason, hypothesis eight is formulated: Companies with high leverage will show 
more tunnelling. 
 
 
RESEARCH METHOD 
Data and Samples 
Our study uses annual reports and a database from the CD-ROM of the 
Indonesian Capital Market Directory (ICMD) to obtain data related to the 
characteristics of companies (sales and financial leverage), operational practices 
of tunnelling, and the variables used to examine the tunnelling mechanism in the 
IDX. We further process the secondary data, which are obtained by collecting 
additional information traced by ICMD during the period 2005–2012 using the 
pooled least square model. 
There are more than 500 public listed companies (PLC) in the Indonesia 
Stock Exchange. However, we use 276 PLCs that are supposed to be connected 
with the phenomenon of tunnelling. The measurement of tunnelling is not 
directly conducted; the direct measurement cannot be commenced using public 
information (annual reports). Therefore, the sampling refers to Johnson et al. 
(2000b) regarding the related party transaction for quantifying the degree of 
tunnelling using the information related to accounts payable (AP) and accounts 
receivable (AR). Because the related transaction has a particular connection with 
the PLC, we first need to divide the difference between AP and AR with the total 
assets. The related party transaction is supposed to exist in the PLC that has 
shown a high imbalance between AP and AR. Therefore, it indicates that the 
dependent PLC is inclined to experience loss in this transaction.  
Finally, using the purposive sampling method, we collected 276 PLC as 
the final sample. The number of samples is consistently determined by employing 
the same sample for the 7-year period (from 2005 to 2012). By utilising the same 
firms, this study leads to the issue of survivorship. This condition is clearly 
intended to reach our main goals, which focus on the particular characteristics of 
a population that are of interest, which will best enable the researchers to answer 
and generalise the research question about the existence of tunnelling activity that 
has been conjectured in the related party transactions as reflection of tunnelling 
activity. Additionally, 276 PLCs are used for homogenous sampling. These units 
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are selected based on the fact that the sample has similar characteristics because 
such characteristics are of particular interested to the researchers in justifying the 
generalisation of tunnelling practice in Indonesia. 
Operationalisation Variables 
This research is conducted using 11 variables. The dependent variable is 
tunnelling, and the remaining variables are independent and control variables. 
Moreover, the categorisation of companies audited by public accountant firms is 
justified by utilising bona fide representatives of the four major public accountant 
firms: Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu, which is surrogated by Osman Bing Satria, 
PwC (Price Waterhouse Cooper), which is represented by Tanudiredja, Wibisana 
& Partners, Ernst & Young, which is proxied by Purwantono, Suherman & Surja, 
and KPMG, which is represented by Sidhartha & Widjaja's accounting firm. 
Anderson's accounting firm was not included in this study because in 2002, 
Anderson was out of business due to the Enron case. Thus, we focus on the 
remaining four international accounting firms. Table 1 shows the definitions and 
the measurements of every variable used. 
Table 1 
Definitions of variables 
 
Variables Definition and measurement Type of data 
TUNNELING  The difference between accounts payable and 
accounts receivable divided by total assets. Here, 
accounts payable and accounts receivable is a 
transaction with a related party (related parties 
transactions) mainly the flows from companies which 
operates from the lower level to the higher level. 
Continuous 
SINGLE Dummy variable, equal to 1 if one shareholder 
controls more than 50% equity. If the shareholding is 
between 40% and 50%, and higher than the 
percentage of shares held by the owner of the second 
to fifth, then we would still regard this as a major 
single shareholder and given a value as 1. Hereby, 
SINGLE is intended to classify the firm which is 
categorised and dominated by the structure of family 
ownerships. 
Dummy (0;1) 
MULTI Dummy variable, if the largest shareholder holding 
shares of 10%–50%, the second largest holding at 
least 10% and the percentage ownership of the owner 
on the second to fifth larger than the percentage 
ownership of the first owner. In particular, MULTI is 
intended to classify the firm which is categorised and 
dominated by non family ownerships structure 
(publicly traded). 
Dummy (0;1) 
  (continued on next page) 
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Table 1 (continued) 
 
Variables Definition and measurement Type of data 
BOARD_SIZE The number of members in the board of directors. Continuous 
OUTSIDER The percentage of outsiders in the board of 
directors. 
Continuous (0–1) 
SHARE The percentage of shares held by senior managers 
(members of the board of directors and senior 
management). 
Continuous (0–1) 
BIG FIVE Dummy variable, equal to 1 if the firm audited by 
the big five accounting firms, and 0 if not. 
Dummy (0;1) 
STATE  Dummy variable, equal to 1 if the government 
becomes the ultimate control of the company, and 0 
if otherwise. 
Dummy (0;1) 
GROUP  Dummy variable, equal to 1 if the firm is under a 
business group, and 0 if otherwise. 
Dummy (0;1) 
INST  The percentage of shares held by the institutional 
investors. 
Continuous (0–1) 
SALES Logarithm natural of net sales as a proxy of the 
company size. 
Continuous 
LEVERAGE Long Term Debt to Total Asset is a proxy of capital 
structure. 
Continuous 
TR Trade receivable obtained from the annual report of 
sample. 
Continuous 
TP Trade payable obtained from the annual report of 
sample. 
Continuous 
TA Total asset, the accumulation of all assets obtained 
from the annual report of sample. 
Continuous 
CASH Cash is a number of money, which is provided to 
anticipate the need of cash in short time period. 
Continuous 
 Note: The operationalisation of variables was processed from various sources.                                                                          
 
Predictive Panel Model Regression  
The analysis is commenced by exploring the descriptive statistics for each 
research variable. We meticulously provide general information regarding the 
mean, the minimum, the maximum and the number of observations. Then, we 
identify the most appropriate model. We thoroughly determine to use the PLS 
model (pooled least squares) with a panel data regression to examine the 
developed hypotheses. The mathematical model employed in the statistical tool is 
shown as follows. 
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TUNNELING = α + β1SINGLEi,t + β2MULTIi,t + β3BOARD_SIZEi,t  
                        + β4OUTSIDERSi,t + β5SHARESi,t + β6BIGFIVEi,t  
                        + β7STATEi,t + β8GROUPi,t + β9INSTi,t + β10SALES  
                        + β11LEVERAGEi,t + ε 
 
(1) 
 
Statistical model 1 is particularly important for describing the 
arrangement of conducting the panel data regression. TUNNELING notably 
denotes the difference between accounts payable and account receivable divided 
by total assets. Here, accounts payable and accounts receivable are a transaction 
with the related party. SINGLEi,t is composed of a dummy that is equal to 1 if the 
shareholder controls more than 50% of the equity. If the ownership ranges from 
40% to 50% and is higher than the percentage of shares held by the second to the 
fifth, then we would still regard this as a major single shareholder and give it a 
value of 1. MULTIi,t is also composed of a dummy. The data are determined to be 
1 if the largest shareholder holds at least 10 to 50%, the second largest holds at 
least 10%, and the percentage of ownerships of the owner on the second to the 
fifth is larger than the first owner. BOARD_SIZEi,t denotes the number of 
members on the board of directors. We also use OUTSIDERSi,t as the percentage 
of outsiders on the board of directors. SHARESi,t is the percentage of shares held 
by senior managers. BIGFIVEi,t is also composed of dummy data regarding 
whether the company uses highly reputed public accounting firms. STATEi,t is 
equal to 1 if the government becomes the ultimate controller of the company and 
0 otherwise. GROUPi,t is equal to 1 if the samples involve a business group and 
vice versa. INSTi,t denotes the percentage of shares held by the institutional 
investors. Sales denotes the logarithm natural of net sales as a proxy of the 
company size. LEVERAGEi,t is composed by dividing the long term debt (LTD) 
with total assets (TA) as the proxy of capital structure.  
In addition to building a robust test result, we employ dummy variables 
to test the existence of tunnelling in every industry dummy. We use 0 and 1 in 
more than two groups to separate the eight industries with the rule of thumb        
n – 1, as observed in Table 4. The reason for using eight industries in this study 
focuses on controlling and investigating the different conditions of tunnelling, 
particularly in specific industrial groups of the Indonesia Stock Exchange.   
Summary Statistics 
We start the investigation of the tunnelling phenomenon by utilising summary 
statistics. We show the general information for the dependent and independent 
variables. The samples used in our study were divided into several groups of 
industries. The objective of the categorisation is to determine the effects of 
industries obtained by testing the statistical models in the panel data analysis. The 
samples are classified into several industrial groups as shown in Table 2. 
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Table 2 
Companies classification based on industrial groups 
 
Industry categories Number of companies Number of observations 
Agricultural  22 176 
Mining  15 120 
Manufacturing 149 1192 
Finance 9 72 
Property 36 288 
Service 11 88 
Retail 18 136 
Other industry 17 144 
Total 276 2216 
 
To describe the particular groups of the industry, Table 3 also presents 
specific information in regard to the characteristics of the samples. It focuses on 
the elaboration with respect to the variables that can be observed from the use of 
several variables, including SINGLE, BOARD_SIZE, OUTSIDERS, BIG FIVE, 
STATE, GROUP, INST, and LEVERAGE, from each company. 
 
Table 3 clearly illustrates the summary statistics output obtained from 
eight independent variables, three control variables and a dependent variable. It is 
discernible that there are several variables that employ a dummy model (0 and 1) 
to distinguish the characteristics and classify the data. These variables are 
SINGLE, MULTI, BIG FIVE, STATE and GROUP. 
 
To identify the tunnelling activity in the Indonesia Stock Exchange, it is 
necessary to investigate the comparison of the industrial effects caused by each 
industry. Moreover, research conducted by Claessens et al. (2000) divides the 
firm specifics into several stages, such as size, age, and pyramid ownership in 9 
East Asian stock exchanges. However, we focus on differentiating the sensitivity 
of every independent variable used as the dependent variable in determining the 
magnitude and the contribution of industrial groups in the Indonesia Stock 
Exchange, as shown in Table 4. 
 
Conversely, there are several groups of industries for which none of its 
independent variables significantly contributes to the dependent variable. These 
groups are property and service. We conjecture that this circumstance is 
considerably triggered by the behaviour of data from both sectors, which do not 
show consistent results from year to year. It is important to note that most of the 
data we use in this study have a large variation. This variation can be investigated 
when we conduct the process of tunnelling measurement, in which the accounts 
receivable, accounts payable, and total assets of the samples incline to show high 
variation from year to year during the observation period from 2005 to 2012.  
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Table 3 
Summary statistics of dependent variable, independent and control variables 
 
Variables N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation 
Panel A: Dependent variables 
TUNNELING 2216 –38.323 10.174 –0.052 1.113 
Panel B: Independent variables 
SINGLE 2216 0.000 1.000 0.586 0.495 
INST 2216 0.000 0.865 0.192 0.192 
BOARD_SIZE 2216 0.000  11.000 4.417 1.879 
OUTSIDERS 2216 0.000 1.000 0.172 0.288 
LEVERAGE 2216 0.000 4.016 0.584 0.412 
BIG FIVE 2216 0.000 1.000 0.345 0.477 
STATE 2216 0.000 1.000 0.821 0.382 
GROUP 2216 0.000 1.000 0.779 0.423 
Panel C: Control variables  
MULTI 2216 0.000 6.000 0.443 0.564 
SHARE 2216 0.000 0.354 0.213 0.055 
SALES 2216 0.000 18.687 13.174 2.122 
 
 
Moreover, the output from Table 4 clearly shows that the retail industry 
performed the largest tunnelling activity of all industry groups. We find that the 
highest value of the coefficient determination (R2) is in the retail industrial group, 
approximately 64.2%. Finance follows with 63.6%, and in third place mining 
with 43.4%. We also show that these results relate to conglomeration activity, 
which is suspected to exist in Indonesia. We have investigated that there are 
relationships among the companies with the other group of industries. In 
Indonesia, it is legal for family firms to own more than one firm. They can have 
majority ownerships and then control a company while performing the same 
action to own several companies in the same or the other industries. 
In addition to the industrial groups analysis results, we employ a 
correlation table that reflects the correlation of every variable used in 
investigating the phenomenon of tunnelling in the Indonesia Stock Exchange. 
The tendency of the correlation between the main variable is shown in Table 5. 
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Panel Data Analysis and Hypotheses Testing 
The hypotheses are also tested partially towards the dependent variable. In this 
step, we aim to identify the magnitude and signs of the effects in every 
independent variable on the dependent variable. Table 6 presents the results of 
the hypothesis testing by employing the pooled least square (PLS) model, as 
follows. 
Table 6 
t-test output for hypothesis testing using consolidated data 
 
Variables 
Unstandardised coefficients 
t Sig. 
Expected signs β Std. error 
(Constant) α  0.070 0.191 0.368 0.713 
BOARD_SIZE (X1) – 0.000 0.014     –0.015 0.988 
OUTSIDERS (X2) – 0.226 0.097 2.317** 0.021 
SINGLE (X3) + 0.055 0.096 0.571 0.568 
GROUP (X4) + –0.135 0.063 –2.148** 0.032 
STATE (X5) + 0.159 0.065 2.455** 0.014 
INST (X6) – –0.024 0.140 –0.174 0.862 
BIG FIVE (X7) – 0.135 0.054 2.506** 0.012 
LEVERAGE (X8) + 0.199 0.058 3.445*** 0.001 
Controlling Variables: 
SHARE  –1.615 0.521 –3.100*** 0.002 
MULTI  0.026 0.079 0.325 0.745 
SALES  –0.027 0.013 –2.048** 0.041 
Dependent Variable: TUNNELING 
F test : 3.585                       Sig (0.000)                                R2     : 0.018 
 
 
The output of the first hypothesis test performs the contribution of 
variable X1 (BOARD_SIZE) towards tunnelling. Table 6 reflects that the value 
of the coefficient regression BOARD_SIZE signals a positive contribution but is 
insignificant at the 5% alpha. We conclude that the first hypothesis is 
unsupported. The second hypothesis examines the effect of variable X2 
(OUTSIDERS) on variable Y (TUNNELING). It shows that the result is 
inconsistent with the theory and the developed hypothesis, in which the increased 
number of BOD outsiders helps reduce tunnelling. The output is not in line with 
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the hypothesis that the coefficient regression of X2 (OUTSIDERS) shows a 
positive sign. Therefore, the second hypothesis is statistically unsupported. 
The third hypothesis conjectures that companies with shareholders who 
are concentrated in single block-holding show more tunnelling than if the 
company has a principal shareholder. In accordance with the output, the third 
hypothesis, which assumed that there is a positive contribution from X3 
(SINGLE) towards Y (TUNNELING), is supported. However, this result is 
statistically insignificant at the 5% level. Furthermore, in the fourth hypothesis, 
we assume that companies with block-holding shareholders in a business group 
tend be more likely to experience tunnelling. Our notion is not in line with the 
estimation result obtained using the pool data. The examination of using 
industrial effects shows various results. The financial, service, and retail sectors 
show the positive signs, but particularly in manufacturing, property, and other 
sectors, the variable GROUP negatively contributes to TUNNELING. The 
previous empirical testing using industrial effect describes different 
circumstances with the pool data. The output also indicates that the coefficient 
regression of variable X4 (GROUP) generates a negative sign. Therefore, the 
fourth hypothesis is unsupported. Furthermore, the fifth hypothesis exhibits a 
positive sign and significantly contributes towards TUNNELING. This is similar 
to the developed notion for the fifth hypothesis that has been explained in the 
hypothesis development. We note that the company will experience more serious 
tunnelling if its block shareholder is the government. Then, we note that the fifth 
hypothesis is statistically supported. 
Next, in the sixth hypothesis, it can be observed that the coefficient 
regression of INST shows a negative sign towards TUNNELING. This result is 
in line with the previously designed hypothesis, in which the sixth hypothesis 
conjectures that a greater percentage of institutional investors will increase the 
practice of good corporate governance, which leads to less practice of tunnelling. 
Therefore, companies will experience less tunnelling. Hypothesis seven depicts 
that companies that are audited by reputable public accounting firms (BIG FIVE) 
show no negative influence on TUNNELING activity in the Indonesian Stock 
Exchange. Furthermore, the hypothesis testing is done by comparing the final 
output of the estimation, specifically hypothesis eight. The output indicates that 
the variable LEVERAGE shows a positive and significant contribution towards 
TUNNELING. Thus, it can be concluded that hypothesis eight, which 
conjectures that large companies with high leverage are expected to show more 
tunnelling, is statistically supported.  
In the next step, we focus on elaborating the goodness of fit model. The 
importance of the goodness of fit model is to discover the extent to which a 
statistical model can explain the variation in its dependent variable. To identify 
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the goodness of a model, we use the criterion called the coefficient of 
determination (R2). Table 6 describes that the R2 value for consolidated data is 
relatively small, 1.8%. It means that the ability of independent variables to 
explain the variation of the dependent variable is only 1.8%, and 98.2% can be 
explained by factors beyond the model used. This result leaves a question 
because the value of the coefficient determination is slightly inconsistent with the 
value of the coefficient determination in eight industrial groups. 
However, there are some explanations that can be presented to explain 
the relatively small value of R2. The contribution of firms-specific effects arises 
in the process of examination, particularly when we perform it simultaneously 
without relating it to any industrial effect. The behaviour of data also indicates 
that all data in a single-pool distribution tend to cause the variation to be diverse. 
Thus, the effect of outliers occurs in some data of specific variables. However, 
the most important thing is regarding to our research objective. Our study intends 
not to create a predicted model but to focus on building a model that aims to 
explain and identify a phenomenon. Therefore, the small alteration in R2 clearly 
shows the variation of the real tunnelling activity measured in the IDX. 
Robustness Test 
In addition to performing the robust results, we conduct a robustness test to 
gather the compelling output related to the testing of tunnelling activity. We 
employ additional continuous variables: trade payable (TP) as the representation 
of debt in a sample, trade receivable (TR), total assets (TA), and variable cash 
(CASH). We also add the previous continuous variables such as BOARD_SIZE, 
OUTSIDER, SHARE, INST, SALES, and LEVERAGE in the mathematical 
model that follows. 
TUNNELING = α + β1BOARD_SIZEi,t + β2OUTSIDERSi,t  
                        + β3SHAREi,t + β4INSTi,t + β5SALESi,t  
                        + β6LEVERAGEi,t + β7TRi,t + β8TPi,t + β9TAi,t  
                        + β10CASH + ε  
 
(2) 
 Each of those ten variables in model 2 is employed to gain the robust 
results. The effect of every single continuous variable is almost the same and 
consistent with the model. The additional variables TR, TP, TA and CASH are 
included to control and purify the possibility that each variable has a direct 
contribution to TUNNELING activity. Based on the estimation using a 
consolidated sample, we note that six variables (OUTSIDERS, SHARE, 
LEVERAGE, TR, TA, and CASH) consistently and significantly contribute to 
the tunnelling activity. Meanwhile, the remaining variables (BOARD_SIZE, 
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INST, SALES, and TP) insignificantly contribute to the tunnelling activity, as 
observed in Table 7. 
Table 7 
Robustness test output using continuous variables on consolidated data 
 
Variables 
Unstandardised Coefficients 
β Std. Error t Sig. 
(Constant) α –0.145 0.107 –1.351 0.177 
BOARD_SIZE –0.013 0.018 –0.691 0.490 
OUTSIDERS 0.004 0.001 2.849*** 0.004 
SHARE –0.022 0.007 –3.154*** 0.002 
INST –0.001 0.002 –0.412 0.680 
SALES 1.972 0.000 0.213 0.831 
LEVERAGE 0.189 0.076 2.472** 0.014 
TR –2.040 0.000 –7.017*** 0.000 
TP 7.521 0.000 0.883 0.378 
TA 6.912 0.087 2.171** 0.034 
CASH 1.591 0.076 2.385*** 0.004 
Dependent variable: TUNNELING 
F test : 6.954                     Sig (0.000)                               R2 : 0.043 
 
 
 
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
Institutional ownership is clearly depicted by the implications of this study. We 
note that the imbalance transaction between accounts payable and accounts 
receivable with its total asset displays a related party transaction between the 
owners of companies. Recall that the study of Dwinanto (2012) reveals the low 
proportion of public ownership in the Indonesia Stock Exchange. His study is 
obviously in line with our findings, in which the high number of listed public 
companies in the Indonesia Stock Exchange indicated tunnelling. Thus, the 
lowest public involvement inclines to result in a high existence of tunnelling, 
where we find that there is an expropriation conducted by the majority 
shareholders to the minority shareholders. This phenomenon can be observed in 
the results of SINGLE ownership in Indonesia, which shows that public 
ownership is concentrated as 27.6% on average, and the institutional ownerships 
is approximately 72.4% on average. 
Ridwan Nurazi et al. 
146	  
In accordance to the statistical results, only a few variables have 
consistently shown the same signs with the proposed hypothesis. These variables 
are observable in hypotheses five, six and eight. However, there is a hypothesis 
that is in line with the proposed hypothesis but is statistically insignificant at a 
5% alpha; this hypothesis is hypothesis three. The other four hypotheses, which 
consist of hypotheses one, two, four, and seven, made no contribution to the 
dependent variable (TUNELLING). 
Furthermore, some results are not in line with the a priori expectation and 
the findings in previous studies. The influence of BOARD_SIZE on 
TUNNELING illustrates a positive sign and is statistically insignificant at a 5% 
alpha. This result is contrary to the findings of Denis and McConnell (2003), who 
note that internal mechanisms including the structure of the board of director 
(BOD), senior management incentive systems, the ownership structure, the type 
of block-holding shareholder, institutional ownership, and corporate transparency 
are useful in reducing the tunnelling activity. La Porta et al. (1998), as cited by 
Bae, Kang and Kim (2002), from their sample of 49 companies report that 
ownership concentration in the largest public company is negatively related to 
investor protections, suggesting that a minority shareholder is less likely to be 
important in countries with poor investor protection. We conjecture that a similar 
result apparently exists in the Indonesia Stock Exchange, in which their notion is 
in line with the previous condition of Indonesian companies, and this 
circumstance commonly occurs in less developed capital markets.  
On the other area, our findings reportedly confirm the results of research 
conducted by Gomes and Novaes (2001). In their study, they found that 
concentrated ownerships clearly facilitate the appropriation of assets; majority 
shareholders not only dominate the stockholder meetings and the board of 
directors (BOD) but also determine the details of daily operation by placing a 
CEO and senior management. Research conducted by Gomes and Novaes (2001) 
produces results similar to our empirical result, which is done in the context of 
the emerging market. In Japan, several studies note that the strategy for 
implementing appropriation assets is not only performed by BOD and CEO but it 
is commonly also exhibited by the main banks. Sheard (1989) notes that banks 
play an essential role in reducing the agency problems of its client firms and that 
it acts as an alternative governance mechanism to the capital market-cantered 
corporate governance systems of Anglo-Saxon countries. 
A company that is controlled by the government (STATE) will likely 
experience more serious tunnelling than a company that is controlled under a 
business GROUP. Such condition considerably exists due to the high ability of 
company to provide sufficient funds in funding the operational activities of its 
counterparts. In addition, the government companies that have shown a better 
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performance and positive trends tend to be privatised. Privatised companies will 
be submitted to the stock exchange, and the remaining firms that just have 
ordinary performance operate under its parent company. Consequently, if the 
parent company faces financial difficulties, it will use the resources from its 
subsidiaries to keep the operational activities running well. Moreover, Bae et al. 
(2000) argue for a similar notion. They empirically test corporate actions such as 
merger activity from 1981 to 1997 to explore the nature of business groups in 
emerging markets. Their study examines two competing views, i.e., the Khanna-
Palepu view that business groups in emerging markets add value to their member 
firms (called the value-addition view) and the Johnson et al. view that business 
groups in emerging markets provide controlling shareholders with an opportunity 
for wealth transfer from the firm for their own benefit (called the tunnelling 
view). Then, the empirical study conducted by Bae et al. (2002) supports the 
tunnelling view that firms that belong to a business group pay less attention to 
maximising individual firm value and make takeover decisions that are beneficial 
to only controlling shareholders. 
Our results exhibit empirical evidence in regard to the phenomenon of 
tunnelling activity in Indonesia. We conclude that our findings contribute to 
revealing this phenomenon. As reported by Claessens et al. (2000), Indonesian 
companies performed the tunnelling activity in its capital market. This finding is 
observable with the high ratio of family ownerships compared to public 
ownerships. We hereby confirm the Claessens et al. (2000) study by showing that 
more than 50% of companies in Indonesia have performed the same method in 
process of managing their companies. As documented by Claessens et al. (2000), 
Indonesian companies are expected to perform the expropriation, in which 
Indonesia is in second place and Hong Kong is in first place. Korea, Malaysia, 
The Philippines, Singapore, Taiwan, and Thailand follow, respectively. 
Furthermore, the owners of large-cap companies in the Indonesia Stock 
Exchange that perform a high ratio of LEVERAGE are suspected of practicing 
tunnelling activity. This notion is supported by confirming our study on 
hypothesis eight. Logically, the high leverage will require high funds with respect 
to fulfilling the maturity of obligations. When the large company has many 
subsidiaries, then it has no problems utilising funds from its subsidiaries in 
fulfilling the obligations. As discussed by Bae et al. (2002), the top 30 businesses' 
expansion in Korea has come from excessive borrowing. As of the end of 1997, 
the average leverage ratio (debt over the sum of debt plus the market value of 
equity) of the top 30 amounted to 90.6%. This result has a correlation with the 
situation in the Indonesian capital market, where we find that the use of high 
leverage presumably leads to the existence of tunnelling activity. 
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CONCLUSION 
Our results make an important contribution in revealing the existence of 
tunnelling activity in the IDX. We conjecture that tunnelling is a manifestation of 
expropriation conducted by the controlling shareholders. Hereby, we focus on the 
phenomenon of the agency problem between the minority shareholders and the 
majority shareholders as the controlling shareholders. Our data agreed with the 
predicted model and the robustness test model, but the results show a slightly 
conflicting result with the a priori expectation, as explained before. However, we 
empirically show that tunnelling activity generally exists in the Indonesia Stock 
Exchange from the observed time period of 2005 to 2012, like the other emerging 
capital markets in Asia. 
Moreover, the implication of this study shows that the existence of 
tunnelling in Indonesia results in the inefficiency of operational activity. 
Specifically, the transaction between the related parties shows that the flow of 
funds clearly intends to support the other affiliation of partner firms. Our 
evidence indicates that concentrated ownerships—either the single ownership 
reflected by the domination of family firms or ownership with the domination of 
a state-owned company—displays that expropriation with highly concentrated 
ownership seems to harm the minority shareholder. This finding suggests that the 
mechanism of good corporate governance is not well implemented. Therefore, a 
majority shareholder tends to expropriate the minority shareholder by transferring 
the welfare from the small firm to the larger firm in terms of financial support.  
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